The big news as I arrived in Khartoum from Darfur earlier this week was of a “framework agreement” and ceasefire between the Sudanese government and one rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
The agreement was formally signed on Tuesday in Doha, Qatar. Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir was there, as was JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, Chadian President Idriss Deby and a host of envoys, including U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration. The agreement creates a “framework” for negotiations – basically a list of items to be discussed and agreed upon.
Notably, and worryingly, justice and accountability – which so many IDPs told us was important to them – are not on the list. It also establishes a temporary ceasefire, although as with the whole framework, the details are still to be worked out. A final agreement is supposed to be completed by March 15, a hugely ambitious – if not unrealistic – target.
Almost exactly a year ago, Khartoum and JEM signed another “framework agreement” and ceasefire in Doha. It went nowhere, as have a sheaf of other agreements in recent years. So there is ample reason to be skeptical. Still, this year’s framework may be more robust. It seems to have high level buy-in from Bashir and JEM leader Ibrahim. And both sides have near term incentives to follow through. Bashir is running on a peace platform (“Symbol of Unity and Peace” says one of his omnipresent campaign posters) in the April elections. JEM is pressed as a result of the recent peace agreement between Khartoum and Chad. In fact, the Sudan-Chad rapprochement caused JEM to move more of its forces into northwestern Darfur, leading to a new round of fighting that promised to be devastating for the civilian population in that area.
To that extent, the ceasefire – if it holds – is definitely a good thing. But although a step forward, a lasting ceasefire – even a final agreement – between JEM and the government is far from a final resolution of the Darfur crisis. JEM is militarily the strongest rebel group, but it has a narrow constituency within Darfur. Giving its officials a handful of government posts would scarcely begin to address the underlying problem of marginalization and exclusion.
Bashir traveled to Darfur after the framework agreement was signed and declared, “The crisis in Darfur is finished; the war in Darfur is over. Darfur is now at peace.” What we saw and heard in Darfur tells us this is plainly not true. The problem of insecurity is cited widely by internally displaced persons, UN officials, civil society leaders and others as one of the principal impediments to peace. This day to day insecurity is felt all over Darfur, impedes a durable end to displacement and restricts the presence of NGOs and UN agencies in the “deep field.”
Now that the dust is settling from the release of the Obama administration’s 
