A Soldier Serving with Darfur's Beleaguered Protection Force (Photo: AFP/Getty)

Security in Darfur continues to deteriorate, as evidenced by reports of intense fighting over the weekend and the armed kidnapping of three aid workers on Tuesday. Amid a faltering ceasefire, deadly attacks against peacekeepers, violence in Jebel Marra, and troubling news of a military build-up, the Save Darfur Coalition has written to the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations  – this month’s president of the Security Council – to address the escalating crisis and its impact on the lives and livelihoods of Darfuri civilians. Today, the UNSC is due to discuss UNAMID in a briefing this morning and consultations in the afternoon.

The text of the letter is below, and can also downloaded it as a PDF.

May 17, 2010

H.E. Dr. Nawaf Salam

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations in New York
866 UN Plaza Suite 531-33
New York, NY 10017

Via Facsimile: +1 212 838 2819

Your Excellency Dr. Salam:

We are writing to you on behalf of more than 190 faith-based, advocacy and human rights organizations that make up the Save Darfur Coalition on the occasion of your term as president of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to urge that you make the increasing security concerns in Darfur a top priority during the month of May.

We appreciate your recent reflection that this month presents Lebanon with the opportunity to enhance its global image, in part through assuming a key role on issues relating to Sudan. We also believe that the leadership of Lebanon can deliver renewed international attention and political momentum toward addressing the crucial challenges that face Sudan and its tumultuous region of Darfur, where hostilities have recently escalated. The Save Darfur Coalition is gravely concerned about current insecurity in Darfur, particularly with regard to the situation in the central region of Jebel Marra and a faltering ceasefire between a leading rebel movement and the Sudanese government. Just this past weekend, fierce clashes are reported to have taken place in Jebel Moon, with potentially serious implications for the plight of local civilians, border security with neighboring Chad, and prospects for peace talks scheduled to resume this week. These developments – in addition to small arms proliferation and an increase in tribal conflict – pose a significant threat to the lives and livelihoods of thousands of civilians.

While we commend recent efforts by the United Nations and the African Union to reach full deployment of the joint peacekeeping operation in Darfur, we are disappointed that the mission has been unable to prevent, monitor, or intervene in most of the recent fighting. Likewise, we would like to express our significant dismay that UNAMID has been unable or unwilling to protect humanitarian operations in Jebel Marra, forcing the withdrawal of aid groups and resulting in a severe lack of information regarding the humanitarian and human rights consequences of the clashes.

The Save Darfur Coalition welcomes that the UNSC Programme of Work for this month – which concludes with the International Day of UN Peacekeepers – includes several sessions dedicated to UNAMID. We hope that as President of the Security Council, you will ensure these briefings and consultations conclude with a concrete plan of action to improve UNAMID’s effectiveness in responding to ongoing violence in Darfur, and to secure its access to recent sites of fighting, which has left thousands of civilians without humanitarian assistance or military protection.

Specifically in relation to this insecurity, we recommend the following UNSC actions:

• Demand accountability and transparency in all investigations of attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping operations and their assets, and actively participate in bringing perpetrators to justice in accordance with the rule of law;
• Demand that all parties live up to their commitments as outlined by the framework agreements signed in Doha and encourage their return to the negotiation table;
• Ensure the Sudanese government’s full cooperation in permitting UNAMID forces to broadly interpret their mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations through the robust and proactive implementation of the applicable rules of engagement;
• Demand repercussions for any obstruction to operations of UNAMID forces by the Sudanese government and Darfur’s armed movements;
• Urge UNAMID commanders to expand the range of security zones patrolled by peacekeeping forces;
• Demand adherence of the Sudanese government, all armed parties, and states to the UNSC arms embargo, per UNSC Resolution 1591; and
• Continue to fully resource and finance all operational needs of the force.

Finally, it is important to note that as instability and insecurity continue to put lives of civilians at risk in Darfur, there are growing concerns about the lack of protection for civilians in South Sudan. In the first four months of 2010, inter-communal fighting resulted in the deaths of at least 450 civilians and the displacement of an estimated 40,000 others. Furthermore, over the past few weeks the post-election clashes between soldiers loyal to Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) General George Athor Deng and other units of the SPLA have sharpened fears that violence in the South may only increase in the months leading up to the critical referenda scheduled for January 2011. Given these concerns, the Save Darfur Coalition calls upon the UNSC under Lebanon’s leadership to monitor this precarious situation closely and provide the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with the political support needed to respond rapidly and effectively to this evolving crisis.
Many in the human rights advocacy community are looking to the Council to act vigorously and strategically in addressing the challenges facing Sudan and Darfur, in particular by robustly confronting the current shortcomings in civilian protection throughout the country during this critical period.

Sincerely,

Amir Osman
Senior Director, Policy and Government Relations
Save Darfur Coalition

Contrary to the agreement of UN and Chadian officials that the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) has “served its purpose,” the BBC reported news of clashes between the Popular Front for National Resistance (FPRN) and Chadian security forces over the weekend. Unofficial reports from the area reference heavy losses of both troops and vehicles sustained by the Government of Chad (GoC) — raising concerns about the possibilities for continuation of humanitarian operations in the area.

The Secretary-General’s speech yesterday continued to maintain that improved relations between Chad and Sudan would allow for a significant reduction of military troops in the volatile Eastern Chad border region; the speech did not respond directly to concerns from human rights groups regarding the financial and logistical components of the new security arrangement. More than 200,000 Darfuri refugees are dependent upon humanitarian operations by international and domestic NGOs for food, shelter, and medical care in the region.

Outlining the proposals advocated in his report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended the MINURCAT mission’s military component in Chad now be reduced from 3,300 troops to 1,400 troops. In context, the remaining military troops would represent only 38 percent of the troops initially authorized by the UN as necessary to securing the displaced refugee population and humanitarian operations in Eastern Chad. (Even before this withdrawal, the MINURCAT deployment never approached its full authorized deployment of 4,900).

As noted previously, over the past year the region has remained among the most hazardous operating environments currently sustaining humanitarian operations. The disruption of humanitarian operations this weekend was not the first such occurrence. Multi-week suspensions of operations by agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in November-December and May 2009.

Without sufficient security in the area, NGOs are unable to provide services ranging from food distribution — a particular concern ahead of the rainy season; water and sanitation projects — vital to control the spread of disease among overcrowded and vulnerable refugee populations; and medical services, including mobile clinics serving rural populations.

The continued absence of a military capable of securing the area and deterring further attacks could threaten not only the refugee community, but the ability of the humanitarian NGOs to continue to operate in the area.

In addition to these concerns, the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s report increase the informal role of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) — formed to provide security in the refugee camps and surrounding areas but increasingly relied upon to provide escorts to many UN agencies and some NGO convoys. The under-deployment of the MINURCAT military component, and its lack of troop-strength capable of providing military escorts, increased the role of the DIS (UN-trained Chadian police); this has diverted the focus of the force away from providing security to camp residents, including protection to women gathering firewood and animal feed and to those travelling to market of farming areas.

Along with replacing the lost 1,400 MINURCAT troops — the Government of Chad must also scale up the capacity of the Gendarmerie Nationale national police force of Chad in order to take over the security escorts required by humanitarians — a challenge considering the lower levels of operational and human rights training provided to this force.

Human Rights groups urged the Secretary-General to consider the security of NGO operations, as well as the need for consultation and transparency with refugee communities and humanitarian agencies on the ground. It is vital that the final recommendations, to be adopted by the UN Security Council later this month, are revised to include these concerns.

In sum, the Secretary-General’s recommendations advocate for the withdrawal of 1,400 troops by 15 July (leaving only 1,900 international troops in Chad until 15 October 2010, when they are planned to cease all operations and commence their final withdrawal), while the Government of Chad must source the necessary financial and logistical resources to secure a volatile region hosting in excess of 200,000 Darfurian refugees, whilst sustaining renewed attacks from militia groups possibly associated with the Government of Sudan.

Since the time of PHR’s investigation, a number of security threats and human rights issues have been recorded — via international media reporting on hijackings and kidnappings of humanitarian aid workers, and reports such as that released by the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH) on the continued need for the peacekeeping force.

Many large-scale infrastructure issues remain, such as the weak Chadian legal system, drought and food shortage, and the continued operation of militarized rebel groups in the area, as well as auxiliary practical issues such as low phone coverage (a key issue for reducing attacks against refugees and humanitarians, as emergency phone calls allow for MINURCAT forces to be alerted to security problems). The recent dispute over the continued presence of the MINURCAT force has detracted focus from these problems, which need to remain at the forefront of the diplomatic and humanitarian agenda in Chad. (Despite ongoing needs in Eastern Chad, the Chadian Government opposed the MINURCAT mission’s renewal in January 2010.)

The withdrawal of MINURCAT transfers responsibility for the security of refugees and humanitarian operations to the Government of Chad (GoC) — a significant challenge for a state with low material wealth and incomplete infrastructure. So, what can be done, given the limitations of the current circumstances?

First, it is important to remember that the continued existence of the 200,000 Darfurian refugees in Eastern Chad relies on the efforts of humanitarian aid workers and UN staff on the ground: managing the refugee camps, distributing WFP rations and shelter items, and providing emergency medical care. Humanitarian agencies have continued to operate in Eastern Chad despite increasingly frequent security threats to NGOs and personnel, and rely on police escorts in order to operate in the Phase IV security environment. The current system of police escorts for NGO convoys must be taken over by the Chadian police force, and it is particularly important that NGOs are not obliged to pay or provide other compensation for the new security arrangements, and that the GoC accept responsibility for ensuring the security of the humanitarian operations.

Secondly, refugee communities and the humanitarian actors working with refugees must be consulted and kept informed of the transition and departure of MINURCAT and how the GoC will continue MINURCAT’s security and protection activities. In order to ensure this takes place, the GoC should immediately establish a dialogue and consultation forum with refugee communities and humanitarian workers, and the international community should remain engaged in the transition process to ensure that this takes place.

Thirdly, it is of utmost importance that the MINURCAT withdrawal not be allowed to disrupt the humanitarian operations in Eastern Chad and/or detract from refugee security and protection. The continued monitoring of the human rights situation on the ground, and a specific focus on the security and protection needs of refugees, is paramount. The numbers of the civilian police force should be increased as the military component is phased out, and measures must be taken in the recruiting process to improve the conduct of police officers, sensitize police to human rights and gender issues, and dramatically raise the number of women police officers.

The disappointing withdrawal of the MINURCAT force — before the benchmarks of withdrawal have been met (see the Secretary-General’s December 2008 reports) — should not distract the UN Security Council or the international community from addressing the ongoing problems affecting the Darfurian refugee population in Eastern Chad. The reduction of arms, sexual and gender-based violence and human rights abuses (demilitarization of camps) must remain a key priority, along with assisting the voluntary and safe return of communities. In addition to resolving security issues on a community level, it is vital that widespread problems, such as the capacity and training of national law enforcement agencies, judiciary and prison systems, are addressed, and that the Chadian military assigns a quick reaction force to take over from MINURCAT’s civilian component.

UNAMID peacekeepers on patrol in Regel El-Kubri, Sudan (UN Photo/Stuart Price)

Most Sudan-related news this week has understandably focused on the country’s historic elections, which came to a close yesterday after a generally peaceful but deeply flawed process. Many journalists documented electoral irregularities, the opposition boycott, and even a few incidents of violence and intimidation. In Darfur – which EU observers declared too insecure for monitoring – another story has gone largely under the radar of the international press.

Just as the nationwide polls were underway, four South African peacekeepers went missing in near Nyala, in South Darfur. On Tuesday—the third day of voting—the joint United Nations African-Union mission (UNAMID) confirmed their abduction at gunpoint.

The kidnappers are allegedly part of a new militia in the region, which calls itself the People’s Democratic Struggle Movement. Jubril Bukhari Abbas, the group’s head, is reported to have acknowledged its members were responsible, but were not acting under the movement’s instructions.

He reportedly said the abductor “was unaware of an agreement which was concluded between the government and [the movement], which has joined the peace march.”

UNAMID spokesman Nouredine Mezni said mission representatives have spoken with the kidnapped peacekeepers, and they are in good health.

Although Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir has declared the war over, impunity and insecurity persist in the form of both direct clashes and unrestrained lawlessness. Recent fighting in Jebel Marra and in Jebel Moon has resulted in up to 400 deaths and has displaced an estimated 100,000 civilians, leaving the local populations without access to humanitarian assistance or military protection.

Darfur’s peacekeepers and aid workers have been increasingly targeted, resulting in kidnapping, banditry, and even killings. This week’s incident is only the latest of many that highlight how the “calm but unpredictable” security environment in Darfur in reality means it is safe for no one, least of all those trying to alleviate the crisis.

It is little wonder, then, why the more than two million displaced people in camps and members of other war-affected communities generally boycotted the registration process in this year’s elections. Opposition politics  remains a dangerous and nearly impossible pursuit in Darfur. Intimidation prevails, and the region remains under a state of emergency. There is no evidence that any of the various armed groups have Darfuri interests in mind as they try to gain leverage amid faltering ceasefires and ongoing peace talks, and the election results will no doubt have implications for their tactics.

Even if one accepts Bashir’s declaration that the war in Darfur is over, the brutal consequences of the crisis on a daily basis confront the vast majority of its citizens. Without the opportunity to choose leadership other than Bashir and his ruling party, Darfuris were understandably hesitant to take any part in a sham that seeks to legitimize a regime that has directly contributed to their ongoing grievances.

Newly deployed M-35P in Nyala. Photo: UNAMID/Albert Gonzalez Farran

It’s been a painfully long time coming, but last week, five Mil Mi-35P gunships settled in to their new home in Nyala, South Darfur. The Ethiopian helicopters – whitewashed for peacekeeping service – will in theory greatly enhance UNAMID’s aerial capacity. They represent a key force multiplier, essential in developing the mission’s rapid reaction capability, including emergency response and tactical intervention.

But after celebrating their long overdue arrival, the first thing on Force Commander Nyamvumba’s agenda was to ask for more. He has made it very clear that this is only one step in a series of many that UN and AU member states must take to provide his peacekeepers with the very best odds possible as they confront endless challenges in Darfur, an advantage they have not thus far enjoyed.

This means giving them the mobility and muscle needed to successfully confront hostile operating conditions, the adversities of which have been compounded by continued obstruction by both the government and rebel groups, as well as by violent attacks directly targeting the mission and its assets.

Amid reports of civilian deaths and mass displacement, recent events illustrate the complex reality of a place far from peace. The use of indiscriminate aerial bombardment by the Sudan Armed Forces against rebel positions in Jebel Moun and Jebel Mara has a disproportionately devastating effect on local populations. Rebel movements have likewise hurt Darfuri civilians by restricting both UNAMID investigations and humanitarian access. In at least one battle – which resulted in more than a dozen deaths, 31,000 displaced civilians, and serious human rights abuses, including sexual violence – highly placed military sources told me that “helicopters and aerial reconnaissance units would have helped…prevent the incident.”

In fact, over the last three months, fatal incidents have repeatedly highlighted the essential role of helicopters in life-saving medical evacuation, rapid investigations and assessment following clashes, tactical intervention and quick reaction capacity, aerial reconnaissance and monitoring, as well as troop and equipment deployment. The Mi-35P is only capable of fulfilling a small number of these tasks.

The Mi-35Ps – with their powerful 30-mm twin-barrel automatic cannons – bring exciting new strength to an operation consistently criticized for being weak and ineffective, but they are in reality only a few items on a long list of aircraft that UNAMID desperately needs to implement its protection mandate. The gunships, while important, have limited impact on the mission’s ability to negotiate Darfur’s harsh terrain, rampant banditry, and prohibitive lack of infrastructure necessary for the efficient movement of troops and equipment to the region’s hotspots. For that, UNAMID requires many more utility and transport helicopters.

For this reason, despite the arrival of the Ethiopian Mi-35Ps, Lt. Gen. Nyamvumba still indicates the lack of helicopters is the mission’s most significant handicap, and that he needs at least 18 to do the job. The Commander’s first concern is his troops: “How do I reinforce them, how do I extract those in danger?”

Just as important, Nyamvumba highlights the impact on UNAMID’s capacity to protect civilians. He warned, “We cannot deliver the mandate without the necessary equipment.”

Amnesty International documented GoS Mi-34 attack helicopters in Darfur

The effort to procure these resources is not new, and the violence that may have been prevented by more timely support is untold.

In 2006, Human Rights Watch urged the international community to provide the beleaguered Darfur force – then solely an African Union operation – with helicopters, which military experts deemed necessary for fulfilling the mission’s mandate to protect civilians and proactively enforcing its rules of engagement. In 2007, a joint NGO report urged fulfillment of the mission’s aerial needs and warned that without helicopters, UNAMID would ultimately be rendered ineffective. In 2008, to highlight the contrast between need and availability, the Future of Peace Operations project compiled a global inventory of attack, transport and observation helicopters in order to identify possible donors. In 2009, in a move welcomed by UNAMID, 22 NGOs once again highlighted the severe lack of vital aerial resources, notably helicopters.

Month after month and year after year, the UN Secretary-General has noted this highly problematic shortcoming in his reports to the Security Council, citing its crippling impact on the mission’s effectiveness.

It is therefore imperative that the arrival of the Ethiopian gunships signal the beginning of renewed attention toward helicopter deployment in Darfur.  At the same time, advocacy and diplomatic pressure must be rigorously applied to fulfill the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) and secure guarantees of freedom of movement and flight clearance from both rebel and government forces. With increased violence and approaching elections, UNAMID cannot afford to be grounded any longer.

Someone has to be held to account for these attacks. Sudanese authorities, responding to Rwandan accusations, have denied involvement and suggested these deaths were inflicted by subversive attempts to sabotage the peace and stability that Darfur “enjoys”. North Darfur Governor Osman Mohamed Yousef Kibir has dismissed the incident as ‘isolated’ and deflected blame to common criminals. He says it was banditry, claiming the peacekeepers were killed by looters for a vehicle.

Make no mistake; these peacekeepers – and the 17 others who have been killed in action since the beginning of 2008 – did not loose their lives simply because of a vehicle. They were not defeated by petty thieves. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the Government of Sudan and its auxiliary forces have created an environment that works against UNAMID and places its troops in daily danger – as evidenced by the three attacks this week, including two lethal ones in as many days.

Regardless of whether one buys into rumors that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allies SLA/MM are trying to scare UNAMID away, or that Darfuri rebel groups are trying to prove they have yet to be defeated, one cannot ignore the reality that the absence of compliance by the Government of Sudan does not mean it can escape some responsibility for the events.

Consider two points. First, according to the United Nations, “no UNAMID movement is permitted without approval by the Government of the Sudan.” Therefore, in the case of both deadly attacks, the SAF or other Government authorities would have been aware of UNAMID’s activities. Additionally, one location, Saraf Omra, is a government “stronghold” where, according to the Rwandan Armed Forces spokesperson, there was no known rebel activity. UNAMID’s Rwandan platoon was escorting a water tanker a mere 300 metres from Sudan government forces when they were ambushed.

At best, this makes the Sudanese Government – which maintains primary responsibility for security in the region – negligent and incompetent; more realistically, it means UNAMID’s troops are the latest victims of the ongoing violence in Darfur that is either sanctioned, facilitated, or directly perpetrated by Khartoum.

There are three main ways in which Sudan has either fallen short of, or directly defied, its responsibilities to ensure peace and civilian protection in Darfur: first, by maintaining a lack of transparency in militia disarmament; second, by failing to implement effective security measures in Darfur; and, third, by obstructing and threatening UNAMID.

Janjaweed refers to militias once armed by Khartoum to implement the mass killing, rape and destruction of Darfuri villages in a systematic campaign targeting specific ethnic groups in Darfur. As part of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the Government of Sudan was responsible for integrating the Janjaweed into its own army and auxiliary forces. However, according to the UN, the Government remains “intransparent and unwilling to account” for controlling and disarming the Janjaweed militias. As such, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan recently reported that it “cannot with certainty exclude the possibility that banditry and the Janjaweed are symptoms of the same problem, which the government has neglected to address.”

It is important to remember that, as a sovereign state, the Government of Sudan is responsible for the security of its own citizens. However, as the UN notes, “there is a systematic failure” in the government’s efforts – or lack thereof – to protect its people. Darfuri civilians – including the millions of internally displaced persons – continue to suffer ongoing harassment and abuse. The Government’s response has been, the UN says, to install “some security posts, mostly manned by under-trained and under-equipped personnel, around the areas where internally displaced persons, primarily women, conduct their livelihood activities.” Rarely do they intervene, and as such, civilians – and now peacekeepers – suffer while the perpetrators “enjoy unchecked impunity.”

In addition to having failed to protect its own civilians, necessitating UN-AU intervention, Khartoum has obstructed the peacekeeping mission at almost every turn, from delaying its deployment to withholding essential equipment; from limiting its movement to directly threatening its personnel. A recent report by the UN Secretary-General even reveals outright threats against UNAMID issued by various authorities in response to IDP camp access, patrols, and aircraft movement.

If, as Khartoum claims, the Government of Sudan is a friend to UNAMID, it has yet to act the part. Officials have announced the arrest of six men allegedly responsible for the recent attacks against UNAMID in North Darfur. They have reportedly been transferred to El Fasher, which is headquarters for the Force and Sector North. If Sudan is truly committed to ensuring UNAMID’s success and protecting its men and women from criminal violence, these suspects should be interrogated and tried with full UN and AU involvement. It is time that countries like Rwanda, Nigeria and South Africa – which contribute thousands of troops to the peacekeeping effort and hold strong positions of leadership within the African Union – more vigorously demand accountability and cooperation from Khartoum. This is, after all, a government that – through embracing impunity – does not simply fail to deter, but effectively provides incentives to criminals and looters to rob well-intentioned peacekeepers of their equipment and, more importantly, their lives. African officials should reflect the steadfast will of their soldiers, and refuse to either tolerate or be intimidated by bandits and war criminals alike.

But yesterday, in response to a UN report that portrays Darfur as a still troubled place, Sudan’s Ambassador Abdalmahmoud Abdalhaleem echoed the former UNAMID commander’s remarks. Criticizing the report for leaving out the essential detail “that the war is over”, he recommended the UN start planning for its departure.

Before UNAMID begins packing up its things—many of which, ironically, have yet to arrive—perhaps it’s time to look again. Abdalhaleem suggests that by omitting the claim that war is over in Darfur, UN officials are using the report to preserve the relevance its mission no longer has. However, what the report actually reveals is that representatives of the beleaguered force were never in a position to make that claim to begin with…..for one very disturbing reason: access to any sustaining evidence has been consistently denied.

Agwai’s initial declaration was based on the absence of large-scale military activities, the weakness of rebel movements, and his own perception that the only immediate threat is banditry. Around the same time, outgoing Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada proclaimed his own accomplishments resulted in the end of civilian massacres in Darfur.

Less than a month after Agwai and Adada uttered their ambitiously optimistic remarks, no fewer than 13 civilian lives were lost as fighting broke out in Korma. Although Agwai posited that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was the only viable rebel faction in Darfur, it was the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdel Wahid (SLA/AW) involved in those lethal clashes that displaced 31,000 Darfuri civilians and reportedly resulted in serious human rights abuses, including sexual violence. Despite having local companies stationed in nearby Mellit and Kutum, the mission was unable to respond to the military build-up, prevent the clashes, and intervene when civilian lives were at stake. In fact, the peacekeeping force was nowhere to be seen. Even after the violence subsided, UNAMID was notably missing. While insufficient aerial reconnaissance and quick reaction capacity are among the operation’s critical shortcomings, UNAMID’s absence was not due to equipment shortages or even mandate issues, but primarily because the belligerents denied it access to the area. For 11 days, UNAMID was unable to patrol or investigate the incident.

That incident—which the UNSG’s latest report reveals to be far from isolated—was a resonant reminder that Agwai and Adada cannot declare over a war to which UNAMID has been deliberately made blind.

Despite signing a Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA) in early 2008, the Government of Sudan has been repeatedly implicated in obstructing UNAMID’s freedom of movement. Although UNAMID now boasts deployment of roughly 75% of its authorized military personnel, Sudanese government officials astonishingly still claim ignorance of its mandate to conduct patrols and monitoring activities to protect civilians and humanitarian activities. The report even reveals outright threats against UNAMID issued by various authorities in response to IDP camp access, patrols, and aircraft movement.

Another recent report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan recounts identical obstructionist measures taken by the Government of Sudan—and others—that have prevented the Panel from effectively carrying out its mandate to monitor the UN Arms Embargo. The data it was able to gather implicate all parties in violating the embargo, procuring illicit weaponry, and contributing to no less than “four distinct conflicts” in which “the Darfurian population continues to be victimized by the effects of attacks and counter-attacks involving most of the armed movements that frequently lead to the disproportionate use of force by the Sudnaese Armed Forces (SAF) and their auxiliary forces, and result in killings, injuries and displacements.”

The truth is that the events that took place in Korma in North Darfur during September not only dispute every claim made by Agwai, reinforced by Adada, and echoed by Abdalhaleem; they also illustrate the complex reality of a place far from peace. Over the past three months, similar events throughout Darfur—including those in which the peacekeeping mission and humanitarian agencies have been directly targeted—reveal that the job of the UN mission to protect civilians in Darfur isn’t done; it’s barely even started.

Both war and peace are at arms length for UNAMID. What is clear that they are placed there, at a distance, carefully, purposefully, and systematically by Darfur’s belligerent parties, most notably by the Government of Sudan. So, is it time to quit? Not at all. UNAMID isn’t in the clear; it’s in the dark.

Our efforts to promote peace, however, cannot be limited to defeating violent extremists for the most powerful weapon in our arsenal is the hope of human beings, the belief that the future belongs to those who would build and not destroy, the confidence that conflicts can end and a new day can begin.

And that is why we will support — we will strengthen our support for effective peacekeeping while energizing our efforts to prevent conflicts before they take hold. We will pursue a lasting peace in Sudan through support for the people of Darfur and the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement so that we secure the peace that the Sudanese people deserve.

Save Darfur Coalition president Jerry Fowler said he was encouraged by President Obama’s words, but that concrete actions were necessary to end the crisis in Sudan:

Save Darfur is pleased that President Obama used his UN speech to reiterate his determination to pursue a lasting peace in Sudan. But, now he must turn these words into action by building an international coalition to apply incentives and pressures to push Khartoum to end the conflict in Darfur and fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The President should use the opportunity presented by the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh to encourage the world’s richest countries to leverage their economic influence to ensure that Khartoum’s debt is not forgiven until it makes concrete and lasting progress toward ending insecurity and instability in Darfur and throughout Sudan. The Save Darfur Coalition looks forward to the release of the administration’s long-overdue Sudan policy review, which we hope will outline the administration’s specific plan for achieving lasting peace in Sudan.