Darfuri Rebels at Negotiations

As I mentioned in my last post, at the request of the African Union Panel on Darfur (AUPD), the Save Darfur Coalition submitted recommendations to the panel on how to promote peace, justice, and reconciliation in Darfur.  You can read our full submission here.

Since no country or international organization has the institutional capacity or required relationships with the Sudanese parties to end the conflict alone, we first urged the AU to closely coordinate its efforts with the international community.  To that end, we recommended that the AU deepen its partnership with the United Nations for peacekeeping and peacemaking while at the same time coordinating all of its efforts with the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the League of Arab States, and key regional states.

In discussing the specific issue of peace, we first rebutted the charge of many that the pursuit of justice in Darfur through the International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings had fundamentally interfered with the peace process:

Despite predictions to the contrary, the talks between the Sudanese government and some of the rebel movements have progressed considerably since the ICC Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant from the court for Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir in July 2008.  In fact, at the time of the Prosecutor’s announcement, no serious negotiations were taking place.  The naming of Djibril Bassolé as AU-UN Mediator that same month and the Qatari invitation to host the talks in subsequent months served as opportunities to re-launch substantive talks among the various parties.  There is no doubt, though, that the possibility of Bashir’s indictment contributed to the Sudanese government’s decision to return to the negotiating table.

It has been argued that the prosecution of Bashir would only embolden the negotiating stance of the Darfuri rebels…The signing of the “goodwill agreement” between JEM and the Sudanese government and the continuing negotiations serves as evidence that the peace process has not stalled because of the ICC proceedings.  On the contrary, the possibilities for reaching a peace agreement – while still not assured – appear closer now than at any point since the Abuja negotiations of 2006.

Writing at the end of June, we also stated that all pressure therefore should be placed on the parties to agree and adhere to a long-term ceasefire that “could give necessary space and confidence for the negotiating delegations to move to the next step of negotiating a final settlement.”   As for the structure of the mediation efforts, we recommended that the AU support a process similar to the Navaisha talks that produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement:

As did Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo with the Naivasha process, AU-UN Mediator Djibril Bassolé should lead the Darfur process.  The Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) should work with Ambassador Bassolé on the plan for a negotiation framework, timeline for negotiations, and appropriate mechanism for shuttle diplomacy.  Bassolé must also be supported by a strong team of diplomats and regional experts and backed by a small group of countries with leverage, high-level support, and full-time representation at the talks.  This inner circle should include the United States, United Kingdom, France, and China. An outer circle group of countries and multilateral organizations (UN, AU, Arab League) should also be engaged in a formal manner to discourage spoilers, and other key nations such as Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and South Africa need to be thoroughly consulted.

On the specific matter of securing a comprehensive and inclusive Darfur peace agreement, we urged the AU to draw lessons from the failed Abuja negotiations and the failed attempts to revive the peace process over the last three years.  We felt the most important lessons from the past demonstrated a current need for the AU and international community to:

• Provide the armed movements with support for pre-negotiations and negotiations;
• Ensure that the Darfurians feel ownership of any peace agreement;
• Support strong civil society input and presence in the peace process;
• Ensure that a Darfur peace agreement advances peace, justice and democracy for all Sudanese; and
• Coordinate all support to the peace process with appropriate regional and international actors.

Finally, we wrote that after multiple failed peace efforts and meandering consultations, the issues at stake in Darfur are fairly well understood. Any final agreement, therefore, must include:

• A substantial sum for individual compensation to be paid by the government;
• International monitoring of a cessation of all forms of state support for the janjaweed militia structure and the complete disarmament of the janjaweed;
• International monitoring and support for encampment of all forces in Darfur (government, rebel, and militia);
• Administrative arrangements for Darfur;
• Power sharing for Darfurian constituencies; and
• A comprehensive plan to address the humanitarian, livelihoods, environmental, and development challenges that Darfur will face in the aftermath of the conflict

As noted yesterday, we feel that the recent AUPD report includes a number of the above recommendations.  Perhaps of most importance, the panel does not view the pursuit of justice as an obstacle to the pursuit of peace.  Instead, it states:

[E]ven as the peace negotiations are taking place, action should be undertaken to investigate the serious crimes that have been committed in Darfur, and to put in place measures to prevent the commission of fresh crimes.

Among other things, the report also make a strong case for the necessity of an immediate ceasefire and an “inclusive process of negotiations” involving the Darfuri armed movements, IDPs and refugees, political parties and civil society leaders.

The challenge of course will be in the implementation of these recommendations. The AUPD fell short of putting forward a concrete plan to support the UN/AU joint mediation efforts of Djibril Bassole.  The team’s responsibilities are outlined in general and ideas for better coordination are suggested, but the report does not detail exactly how – in its words – the “AU/UN Joint Mediation should be properly positioned to discharge its mission.” In short, a lot is left for follow-up work.

Yet, President Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) are notorious for making verbal commitments to a peace process, only to continue their non-stop efforts to divide and intimidate those Darfuris seeking a durable and just peace agreement.  There is no doubt that Bashir and the NCP are now devising ways to influence the implementation of these recommendations.  It is for these reasons that we have called for the United States and the international community to put together a set of incentives and pressures to ensure that the Sudanese government does not unduly take advantage of critical processes like the Darfur negotiations.

In my next post, I will summarize the coalition’s recommendations for seeking justice in Darfur, and how the AUPD’s recommendations of hybrid courts could actually work as a mechanism for accountability complementary to – but not a replacement of – the ICC proceedings.