Estimates of casualties continue to rise with France’s top human rights official, Francois Zimeray, citing more than 2,000 deaths. Local and foreign mercenaries appear to be taking a large role in crowd suppression with one group of men arrested in Benghazi reputed to have been brought in from Chad.

Defections of Libyan diplomats continue as a group of Libyan UN diplomats stationed in Geneva have now resigned. Libya’s Interior Minister, Gen Abdul Fatteh Younis, has urged Qaddafi to resign.

Reports have indicated that the Obama administration is currently pursuing sanctions on Libya in response to the violence and Switzerland has frozen Qaddafi’s assets there.

Genocide Intervention Network/Save Darfur Coalition has created a petition to UN Ambassador Susan Rice, asking for the implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya and the creation of a reconstruction fund, among other asks. Sign this petition today by sending a letter to Ambassador Rice and help end mass atrocities against the civilians of Libya.

On Sunday, December 12^th, from 10 to 11 a.m. Eastern Time (7 to 8 a.m. Pacific Time), the i-ACT team will broadcast “Why Darfur: A Refugee Town Hall Meeting” a live online forum with Darfuris living in a refugee camp along the border between Chad and Darfur.

Please show the refugees your support by submitting your questions and hearing their stories. Let them know the world has not forgotten about the people of Darfur, even as the international community focuses on the referendum on southern independence. Just as you had the chance to submit Sudan questions for President Obama during his MTV town hall broadcast, the refugees will be take questions submitted to i-ACT via Twitter, Facebook, and the webcast comment box.

Stay updated on i-ACT’s current trip to Chad through videos, pictures, and reports posted by the team and log in on Sunday to participate in this global webcast!

Photo by Stop Genocide Now.  See more on their Flickr page.

Contrary to the agreement of UN and Chadian officials that the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) has “served its purpose,” the BBC reported news of clashes between the Popular Front for National Resistance (FPRN) and Chadian security forces over the weekend. Unofficial reports from the area reference heavy losses of both troops and vehicles sustained by the Government of Chad (GoC) — raising concerns about the possibilities for continuation of humanitarian operations in the area.

The Secretary-General’s speech yesterday continued to maintain that improved relations between Chad and Sudan would allow for a significant reduction of military troops in the volatile Eastern Chad border region; the speech did not respond directly to concerns from human rights groups regarding the financial and logistical components of the new security arrangement. More than 200,000 Darfuri refugees are dependent upon humanitarian operations by international and domestic NGOs for food, shelter, and medical care in the region.

Outlining the proposals advocated in his report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon recommended the MINURCAT mission’s military component in Chad now be reduced from 3,300 troops to 1,400 troops. In context, the remaining military troops would represent only 38 percent of the troops initially authorized by the UN as necessary to securing the displaced refugee population and humanitarian operations in Eastern Chad. (Even before this withdrawal, the MINURCAT deployment never approached its full authorized deployment of 4,900).

As noted previously, over the past year the region has remained among the most hazardous operating environments currently sustaining humanitarian operations. The disruption of humanitarian operations this weekend was not the first such occurrence. Multi-week suspensions of operations by agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in November-December and May 2009.

Without sufficient security in the area, NGOs are unable to provide services ranging from food distribution — a particular concern ahead of the rainy season; water and sanitation projects — vital to control the spread of disease among overcrowded and vulnerable refugee populations; and medical services, including mobile clinics serving rural populations.

The continued absence of a military capable of securing the area and deterring further attacks could threaten not only the refugee community, but the ability of the humanitarian NGOs to continue to operate in the area.

In addition to these concerns, the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s report increase the informal role of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) — formed to provide security in the refugee camps and surrounding areas but increasingly relied upon to provide escorts to many UN agencies and some NGO convoys. The under-deployment of the MINURCAT military component, and its lack of troop-strength capable of providing military escorts, increased the role of the DIS (UN-trained Chadian police); this has diverted the focus of the force away from providing security to camp residents, including protection to women gathering firewood and animal feed and to those travelling to market of farming areas.

Along with replacing the lost 1,400 MINURCAT troops — the Government of Chad must also scale up the capacity of the Gendarmerie Nationale national police force of Chad in order to take over the security escorts required by humanitarians — a challenge considering the lower levels of operational and human rights training provided to this force.

Human Rights groups urged the Secretary-General to consider the security of NGO operations, as well as the need for consultation and transparency with refugee communities and humanitarian agencies on the ground. It is vital that the final recommendations, to be adopted by the UN Security Council later this month, are revised to include these concerns.

In sum, the Secretary-General’s recommendations advocate for the withdrawal of 1,400 troops by 15 July (leaving only 1,900 international troops in Chad until 15 October 2010, when they are planned to cease all operations and commence their final withdrawal), while the Government of Chad must source the necessary financial and logistical resources to secure a volatile region hosting in excess of 200,000 Darfurian refugees, whilst sustaining renewed attacks from militia groups possibly associated with the Government of Sudan.

Former UNAMID Force Commander Meets SLA Field Commander (UN Photo/Stuart Price)

Without excuses and without exception, when humanitarian and human rights are threatened, there must be independent monitoring; when violated, there must be an investigation. This applies as much to oppressive government forces as it does to their challengers. When clashes threaten the lives and livelihoods of civilians, the rebel cause is weakened. SLA-AW, take note.

Obstructionism – sometimes enforced by hostile threats – against Darfur’s embattled peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) has become a serious problem. Despite recent advances toward full deployment, other factors have severely limited its troops from implementing their mandate to effectively protect civilians. Perhaps most troubling of these is the extent to which all key belligerent parties continue to restrict UNAMID’s monitoring patrols and access to the sites of ongoing or recently concluded clashes, most of which have resulted in the limitation of humanitarian assistance and direct abuses against local populations—including human rights violations, civilian deaths, and mass displacement.

Though this is far from an emerging problem in Darfur, it requires renewed attention and must be addressed with the rigorous application of impartial standards to all groups involved, while acknowledging responsibility is not shared equally. The reality – which varies over time depending on military and political strategy –  is some are worse offenders than others. In December, we highlighted the role of the Government of Sudan (GoS) in impeding the work of UNAMID and the UN Panel of Experts. Today, we single out the SLA-AW for obstructionist actions that have complemented, rather than counteracted, GoS destabilizing activities and have further eroded civilian security while promoting impunity in Darfur.

The latest report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMID cites 21 restrictions on freedom of movement, breaking down as such:

None of these groups has a defensible reason for their actions, but SLA-AW is out at least nine. Further, they have been implicated in threatening UN peacekeepers by firing shots and confiscating UNAMID equipment. In November of last year, SLA-AW also obstructed humanitarian activities, without any apparent regard for the severity and urgency of local civilian needs.

The international community led by JSR Gambari must make it clear that while fulfillment of materiel and personnel needs are essential, ending such severe obstructionism should be a priority second to none. Furthermore, although the long overdue arrival of 5 Ethiopian tactical helicopters represents welcome progress, guarantees of flight clearance must be secured from both rebels and government forces, and immediate facilitation of UNAMID aerial reconnaissance capacity must be realized.  The incidents described above indicate that the mission’s full impact and ability to implement its mandate cannot be achieved without these measures.

As we’ve noted before, both war and peace in Darfur continue to be placed purposefully and systematically at arms length. While UNAMID is often the target, it is always and invariably the civilians who suffer the consequences.  And although the UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur has been called many things, the truth is almost always ignored: these peacekeepers are quite literally the only force standing between a vulnerable, victimized population and criminally rampant insecurity perpetuated by belligerent parties that seem to increasingly hold their own interests above those of Darfuri civilians.

For the Secretary-General’s full report to the UN Security Council, click here. See section IV. Security Situation, page 5 for more details on obstructionism by Darfur’s key belligerent parties. UNAMID’s November 2009 statement on SLA-AW restrictions can be found here.

For a different perspective on this issue, click here.

A UN Convoy in Goz Beida, Chad (Photo: The Peacekeepers Flickr)

International human rights and humanitarian groups have expressed increasing alarm over recent developments regarding the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) as its March 15^th mandate expiration quickly approaches. Since last month, Chadian officials have been indicating to the UN Security Council that they will not seek its renewal. Though initially regarded as a possible negotiating tactic, N’djamena seems to have both sustained and strengthened its position, publicly questioning the relevance and impact of the troubled mission.

At stake in these negotiations is the fate of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable civilians.

MINURCAT has been deployed since March 2008, tasked with providing protection to 170,000 internally displaced persons and 250,000 Darfuri refugees as well as to the humanitarian groups aiding the region’s besieged population. According to Amnesty International the mission is a source of limited but essential protection from attacks “by Chadian armed opposition groups, irregular militias, criminal gangs, and members of the Chadian security forces.” Human Rights Watch likewise claims that the peacekeepers “appear to have prevented a resumption of large-scale violence and mass killings,” and that “despite its many challenges, [MINURCAT] is improving protection and security for civilians” amid prevalent violent crime – including sexual and gender based abuse – and rampant impunity.

Earlier this month, President Idriss Déby of Chad reaffirmed his government’s position that MINURCAT’s mandate should not be renewed, calling the peacekeeping mission a “failure”. The country’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations – Ahmad Allam-mi – announced at a press conference last week that Chadian forces should assume responsibility for security near the Sudan border, as MINURCAT’s military component – having caused “difficulties” and “served its purpose” – should consider its withdrawal.

On the one hand, the Chadian government has questioned whether MINURCAT, which has struggled to complete its deployment, would be able to secure the region even at full capacity. On the other, Allam-mi voiced concerns that the UN Mission’s presence has caused problems ranging from an increase in the cost of living to a deterioration of infrastructure conditions. While acknowledging that MINURCAT still had a role to play in certain areas of assistance – including continued support of the Détachement Integré de Sécurité – Chadian officials have suggested that security-related concerns could adequately be addressed by both strengthening UNAMID in Darfur as well as by the recent improvement of Sudan-Chad relations along the border.

However, there are serious reasons to question the introduction and sustainability of security based on these factors. Recent fighting in Jebel Moun and elsewhere has reportedly caused thousands of Sudanese to flee across the border into Chad, representing a significant shift in the regional security dynamic. Meanwhile, rather than serving as a deterrent to such clashes, UNAMID – itself often a target of attacks – has faced obstructionism by all belligerent parties, and as such has largely been unable to prevent, intervene in, or investigate ongoing violence in the west. With the security situation in Darfur becoming more serious, stability along the border and in Eastern Chad is threatened. Removing MINURCAT’s military presence could have more serious consequences than current assessments may indicate.

Additionally, although improvements in Sudan-Chad relations are welcome, there is cause for both skepticism and caution. Agreements have been made in the past, but tensions and outright hostilities better characterize recent relations between the two countries. Last fall, the UN Secretary-General warned that this problematic dynamic was stalling peace efforts and “exacerbating the plight of civilians.” Severing MINURCAT’s military presence based on the assumption of sustained diplomatic success may prove naïve, particularly as both volatile countries approach elections.

With less than a month before the mission’s mandate expires, the Chadian government has expressed interest in finding a compromise “between total withdrawal and merely extending” the current terms of the mandate. While the international community should be taking the opportunity of MINURCAT’s mandate renewal to seek ways to improve its shortcomings and enhance its impact, negotiations to accommodate political changes have apparently sidelined very real security risks.  Any agreement must prioritize the protection of civilians, and all parties should acknowledge – and avoid at all costs – the potential impact of the looming security vacuum on both the immediate and long-term protection and promotion of human rights in Chad and Darfur.

Rebels in eastern Chad (Photo: Reuters)

Is there an end coming to the Sudan/Chad proxy war? Perhaps, and that may be a good thing in the long run, but in the short run the people of North Darfur are bearing the brunt of changing calculations by the ruling regimes in Khartoum and N’djamena. The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) last week issued an urgent warning about attacks on civilians by the Chadian opposition forces operating in North Darfur. These troubling developments may be in response to the much rumored rapprochement between Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Chadian President Idris Deby.

A Sudanese delegation last week traveled to N’djamena, Chad, to continue bilateral discussions on ending the proxy war between the two countries. These talks­­—which began in October­—allegedly aim to create a “framework for joint patrols on their shared borders” and to normalize diplomatic relations. The United States has welcomed the dialogue as “a key element in advancing the Darfur Peace Process.” This reading is dead-on. Just as important though, the international community and the United States must offer support for the implementation of commitments made by both Chad and Sudan, while at the same time speaking out about any human rights abuses committed by all armed forces in the region.

The Small Arms Survey provides a helpful background to the tensions and hostilities between Sudan and Chad:

Throughout the 1990s Déby was a loyal ally of the regime in Sudan. He consistently refused to supply aid to Sudanese rebels—whether from Darfur or South Sudan—despite requests to do so since the early 1990s. But from 2003 he was unable to stop the two rebel movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base, recruiting combatants even among the Chadian Republican Guard (a pillar of his regime) and garnering support among the Chadian Beri, including those close to the government.

…Déby’s inability to prevent those close to him from supporting the Darfur rebels weakened his credibility among power-brokers in Khartoum. In response, starting in 2003, Khartoum incorporated Darfur based Chadian opposition elements into the janjawid…When these groups were not fighting alongside the Sudanese army in Darfur, they launched periodic attacks on Chadian territory.

In 2004 Khartoum started asking the numerous rebel Chadian factions to unite. From 2005, Déby began a rapprochement with Darfur rebel groups (SLA–Minni Minnawi and JEM), in exchange for their commitment to aid in fighting Chadian rebels on Chadian soil. The situation deteriorated rapidly .An attack on the border down of Adré on 18 December 2005 by the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et les libertés (RDL), a Chadian rebel movement made up of Tama led by Captain Mahamat Nour Abdelkarim, marked a turning point. Déby now realised that Sudan was decisively supporting Chadian rebels against him. While the rebels did not manage to take Adré, the raid allowed Mahamat Nour to display his strength and later assume the leadership of the Sudan-supported rebel coalition, the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC). From this point onwards Déby actively supported the Darfur rebels.

In the last two years, this proxy war has included rebel offensives on both capitals. Two months ago, the UN Panel of Exports Report identified the Sudan/Chad hostilities as a key component of the Darfur ongoing crisis, noting that they serve as a chief “impediment to the political process that also has a negative impact on the settlement of the conflicts between Chad and the Chadian armed opposition groups and between the Sudan and JEM.” In the last month, in fact, Chadian President Idris Deby has both bombed rebel forces and offered to make peace with them.

So any concrete signs that Khartoum and N’djamena are beginning a period of rapprochement are significant. Given numerous broken previous agreements though, this dialogue must be viewed with much skepticism. The United States and the international community can and should support this dialogue and the implementation of any new agreements in a few ways.

First, it should speak out about any human rights abuses being committed by Chadian opposition forces in Darfur or Darfuri rebel movements in Chad. The recent reports of attacks in Darfur by the Chadian opposition most likely are due to these forces responding to a possible deal between Khartoum and N’djamena. In its report on these incidents, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) called on the government of Sudan and relevant UN representatives to initiate a full and thorough investigation. As it’s doubtful that the Sudanese government will heed such advice, the United States must be out front on this issue.

Second, the United States should also take up the recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts and push “the [United Nations] Security Council [to] explore possible ways to provide assistance to the…cross-border monitoring activities, including by expanding the mandate of UNAMID, providing it with the necessary resources and taking account of issues of command and control.”

Ultimately, an end to the Sudan/Chad proxy war could serve as a positive step forward in achieving peace and stability in Darfur and eastern Chad. In the short term, however, the agreement could be a catalyst for more violence against civilians as different armed groups adjust to the changing strategic realities. During this period, human rights monitors must be vigilant and any perpetrators of violence should be held accountable. Any deal by Khartoum and N’djamena will remain only ink on paper unless an agreement is immediately followed by monitoring and implementation supported by the international community.

From the release:

Chadian rebel groups which had moved into North Darfur in early November have been committing a series of attacks against the civilian population reminiscent of the tactics employed by the janjaweed militias and government forces early in the Darfur conflict. Villages have been raided, property looted, and women raped.
…
The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies believes that these acts may constitute war crimes and call on the government of Sudan and relevant UN representatives to the initiate a full and thorough investigation. The perpetrators should be held accountable. At the same time, the international community should do more to ensure that civilians are protected, including ensuring full logistical and political support for the joint United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force (UNAMID) and pushing it to take robust action.

Read the full release.

On March 15, the European Union-led EUFOR mission in eastern Chad reached the end of its one-year mandate. As a result, command of peacekeeping was turned over to the UN Mission in Chad and Central African Republic (MINURCAT), previously an implementing partner with EUFOR over the past year. While EUFOR consisted of about 3,500 peacekeepers, MINURCAT is set to deploy around 5,000 total troops and police at full force. While the immediate impact of this power transfer was minimal—essentially, a couple thousand people changed the color of their hats to blue—the longer-term impact may be considerable.

MINURCAT’s main responsibility—like EUFOR before it—is to protect humanitarian operations, internally displaced Chadians, and refugees crossing the border from Darfur. The border region between eastern Chad and Darfur is notoriously known for attacks on civilians from both sides, as well as a staging and recruitment ground for various rebel movements.

And with the hand-over, we’re hearing familiar things. The UN force that is replacing EUFOR is not up to full strength, and is not expected to be until the end of 2009. This problem is, of course, exacerbated by the fact that UNAMID, its counterpart in Darfur, has also not reached its full deployment levels. This situation creates a potentially dangerous power vacuum in an area that is already unstable.

Making matters worse, the decision by the Sudanese government to expel aid workers responsible for the care of some 4.7 million internally displaced Darfuris may trigger a mass-migration from Darfur into eastern Chad, thereby overwhelming already-taxed humanitarian agencies and security forces in the region. This could potentially put hundreds of thousands of refugees in a vulnerable, concentrated space with an incapable aid system and a faltering security force.

With a weakened UNAMID on one side of the border and a weakened MINURCAT on the other, refugees and IDPs from both countries may be left with little protection and no options. The resulting humanitarian nightmare could further destabilize the entire region—vastly increasing the danger to civilians, peacekeepers, and neighboring nations. As UNHCR representative Serge Male states, “Darfur creates the earthquake that impacts the whole region.”