Burnt out SPLA Huts outside of Malakal
The charred remains of a security outpost lie ominously along the side of the road between the southern Sudanese town of Malakal and the United Nations compound just beyond the town limits. I passed that outpost just a few days after the militia attack that destroyed it and had a chance to speak with people on the ground about what transpired in Malakal. What I heard was indicative of perhaps the greatest challenge facing the soon-to-be state of South Sudan, balancing security and human rights in the face of militia violence.
What Happened [see Will Swanson's blog for an on the ground account]
On the morning of March 12th, shots rang out through Malakal. Security forces, usually heavily posted in the town, had left to help chase the most prominent southern militia leader, George Athor, leaving the town vulnerable. Commander Olony, a Shilluk trader turned militia leader, took advantage of the security vacuum, burning several buildings and engaging remaining security forces, resulting in the deaths of more than 30 people and the displacement of 103 orphans caught in the fighting.
What happened in Malakal is indicative of the broader security challenge faced by South Sudan as it approaches independence. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which fought the Sudan Armed Forces of the north in a 22 year civil war, is made up of a range of groups loyal to their ethnic groups, localities, and particular personalities. Since the unifying goal of southern independence became all but inevitable with a January referendum, the unity of that southern alliance has begun to see cracks. As detailed recently by The Enough Project’s Mayank Bubna, a host of militia leaders now threaten to act as spoilers.
The Fog of War
Information around militia attacks is often muddled. Within the first days of the fighting in Malakal, there were varied, often contradictory accounts of what had happened. International media initially attributed the attacks to Athor, with no mention of Olony. Residents spoke of an attack across the Nile River to the west, but UN officials later confirmed that the attack had come from the north, right past the UN compound. A UN security official told me that there were strong indications that Olony was working with Athor (as claimed by Athor) and that the attack was “well-planned, well-coordinated, and well-executed”, while a western security adviser to the SPLA told me that close collaboration between Athor and Olony was unlikely and that the success of the attack was “more by accident than by design”. Similarly, the numbers killed or injured varied greatly between SPLA, UN, and NGO reports.
Shilluk Woman in Malakal Market
Complex Origins
Part of the reason for the varying accounts is the complex origins of militia attacks like that of Olonyi. There has been a history of violence in and around Malakal driven not only by opportunistic personalities seeking a bigger piece of the post-independence pie, but also by local land disputes, banditry, cattle raids, Shilluk-Dinka ethnic tensions, and intra-Shilluk power rivalries. Olony is not a natural militia leader, but rather a local tradesman of the Shilluk, the third largest minority ethnic group in South Sudan. South Sudan’s main opposition leader and former foreign minister, Lam Akol, is also a Shilluk who has had a history of shifting alliances and playing a divisive role in the South, even as he maintains ties to the North. Such historical and ongoing ties lead to charges of ever higher involvement of officials stoking local tensions. The day after the Malakal attack SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum produced documentation that he said proved involvement of the North and Akol in supplying weapons to southern militias including Athor and Olony. Akol denies the accusations and even knowing Olony. Beyond Athor and Olony there is a long list of local militia leaders who could act as potential spoilers, each with their own set of grievances, opportunistic motivations, and local ethnic loyalties. The SPLA has offered integration to some, while fighting others.
Heavy-Handed SPLA Response
A third illustrative example provided by the March 12th violence in Malakal, and perhaps the most worrisome, is the heavy-handed response of the SPLA to the militia attacks. Olony’s militia was pushed out of Malakal within hours, but a ‘mop up operation’ looking for elements loyal to him was continued throughout the following week. This ‘operation’ included arbitrary targeting of Shilluk with looting, harassment, and even reports of summary executions. The SPLA continues to deny access to UN peacekeepers in a large area near Malakal where militia fighting continues.
Sign in downtown Malakal discouraging violence during the referendum.
As militia threats continue, such responses will only become more attractive to an armed movement that is just recently trying to establish itself as a political party. It will also have further implications for the nature of the new government of South Sudan, which, as a recent International Crisis Group report shows, will clearly continue to be dominated by the Dinka-led SPLM. How the SPLM opens up to other southern groups and how it reacts to militia violence will define the South’s ability to remain secure and free.
The Eyes of the World
As Southern independence looms, it will be imperative for the international community to recognize the complexities and see through the fog of war to identify and decry any meddling of the North in stoking southern tensions. But it will also be necessary to remind the leaders of the South, even as we congratulate them on independence, that the eyes of the world are on them, and that it is not in their interests to become a mirror image of the heavy-handed regime it has just left in the North.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Save Darfur Coalition.
Tags: Malakal, Militias, South Sudan, SPLA, SPLM
