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Overcoming Fragmentation and Intransigence

August 21st, 2009 by Sean Brooks

Darfuri rebel politics since the signing of the failed Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006 has been confusing and difficult for outsiders to monitor. Estimates over the last three years about the fragmentation of the two Sudan Liberation Army factions (SLA/Abdel Wahid and SLA/Minawi) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have ranged from as little as five significant groups to as many as twenty-eight splinter factions. Tracking the constantly fluid relationships among these different Darfuri factions and their leaders has been next to impossible for analysts and advocates. All agree though that this fragmentation has made obtaining peace in Darfur more painfully elusive for the conflict-afflicted Darfuris and more challenging for regional and international mediators.

US Special Envoy Scott Gration

US Special Envoy Scott Gration

It is good news, therefore, to see U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Gration on his way to Addis Ababa to participate in unity talks among the rebels. He recognizes that they must have a common negotiating position if any negotiations with the Sudanese government are going to be successful. These are the correct lessons to draw from the peace talks in Abuja that secured the signature of only one major rebel faction led by Minni Minawi for the Darfur Peace Agreement – yet amplified the infighting and mistrust among the rebels which has contributed to the last three years of internal conflict and fragmentation.

It is also good news to hear Gration promoting the role of Darfuri civil society leaders in the peace talks. He told reports today, “Civil society must also speak up so that their voices are heard on issues related to land reform, elections and human rights.” Only three months ago, the Sudanese government scuttled the most promising initiative on this front – Mandate Darfur – by obstructing the safe passage of Darfuri delegates to a large-scale gathering in Addis Ababa. Save Darfur and our partners have urged the international community through their support of negotiations to make the participation of these community leaders a priority. These representatives of IDP camps, women’s and professional groups, and other community-based organizations can help ensure that the true concerns and demands of the Darfuri people are clearly articulated and addressed by all sides during the negotiations.

Abdel Wahid al-Nur

Abdel Wahid al-Nur

Despite these positive signs of U.S. leadership in the Darfur peace process, the statements and actions of some rebel leaders remain troubling. The Sudan Tribune today reports that Abdel Wahid al-Nur will not attend or send representatives to the unity talks in Ethiopia. This decision continues Nur’s irresponsible negotiating strategy since his refusal to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. After leaving Abuja at the end of the talks, Nur has spent the majority of his time in Paris where he has refused to commit to new talks with the Sudanese government. Instead, he demands that a long-list of his demands must be fully met and implemented before any negotiations can begin, including the imposition of a no-fly zone in Darfur and the complete disarmament of the janjaweed.

While Nur has reportedly not visited Darfur since 2004 and lost the allegiance of many commanders on the ground, he retains key support in many of the IDP camps. Therefore, his dismissal of unity talks is significant. Can Special Envoy Gration and those Darfuris committed to re-launching peace talks ignore Abdel Wahid’s absence? For now, they have no choice. They must begin the tough work of building a common negotiating platform for the Darfuri people and tearing down the walls of enmity between rebel leaders that have helped prolong the conflict in Darfur. At the same time, Gration and others must continue to think of how to devise an appropriate way in for Abdel Wahid and other hardliners. If Nur shows signs of changing his intransigent negotiating stance, the international community should develop a face-saving path for him to climb down from his past rhetoric and enter into a new process of substantive negotiations with the Sudanese government to bring peace to Darfur.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Save Darfur Coalition.

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